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Abstract—This paper presents a software-based technique 
to recover control-flow errors in multithreaded programs. 
Control-flow error recovery is achieved through inserting 
additional instructions into multithreaded program at compile 
time regarding to two dependency graphs. These graphs are 
extracted to model control-flow and data dependencies among 
basic blocks and thread interactions between different threads 
of a program. In order to evaluate the proposed technique, 
three multithreaded benchmarks quick sort, matrix 
multiplication and linked list utilized to run on a multi-core 
processor, and a total of 5000 transient faults has been injected 
into several executable points of each program. The results 
show that this technique detects and corrects between 91.9% 
and 93.8% of the injected faults with acceptable performance 
and memory overheads. 
Keywords: control-flow checking; mutithreaded program; 
control-flow error recovery; on-line testing; multi-core 
processor; interprocess communication; 
1.  Introduction  
Improvement in CMOS technology has brought the 
exponential growth in the number of transistor per chip and 
decreasing feature size. Reduction in transistor size and 
voltage levels coupled with increased sensitivity of 
microprocessors to transient faults [2]. Transient and 
permanent faults can cause tremendous damage in computer 
systems, especially in safety-critical systems. Two main 
groups for designing reliable systems have been proposed in 
past [16]: 1) Hardware-based approaches, relying on adding 
custom hardware, and 2) Software-based approaches, 
relying on exploiting devised software to achieve fault 
tolerance. One of typical hardware-based solutions is to use 
of an external hardware like watchdog (checker) processor 
to monitor activities carried out by microprocessors. As 
soon as any misbehavior is observed, suitable fault 
containment procedures are activated [1], [4], [12], [13], 
[15], [16]. Adding redundant hardware for fault tolerance 
would undermine benefits of modern processors due to area 
and power impositions. Software-based approaches improve 
the dependability of processors by acting only on the 
software, while the underlying hardware remains 
unchanged. Numerous software-based error detection and 
error recovery techniques have been devised to assess 
processor errors and restore the correct system operation in 
modern processors like multi-core processors [2], [8], [9], 
[19]. These approaches typically contain error detection and 
error correction phase. In detection phase, two copies of a 
same program are executed on the multiprocessor system as 
separate threads and then their outputs are compared to 
detect any mismatch. Error correction phase ensures proper 
supervision of a fault-tolerant algorithm, restoration 
circuitry and inter-module interconnect. 
Some software-based error detection techniques can be 
applied automatically to the source code of a program, 
automatically. These techniques that check program 
execution flow are known as control-flow checking (CFC) 
techniques. Lots of CFC techniques have been proposed in 
the past which are mainly based on signature monitoring 
principle [3], [5], [6], [10], [14], [23]. Some of them are 
processor-independent and can be applied to any kind of 
processors and microcontrollers. In these approaches firstly, 
program code is partitioned into basic blocks and secondly, 
extra instructions are added to each basic block. Basic block 
includes a maximal set of ordered non-branching 
instructions (except in the last instruction) or branch 
destinations (except in the first instruction) in which the 
execution begins from the first instruction and terminates at 
the last instruction [4]. Each basic block is assigned a 
unique signature. Signatures are calculated at run-time and 
next compared with the original ones which were calculated 
at compile time. If any mismatch has observed, an error is 
detected and reported [3]. It has been shown that between 
33% and 77% of transient faults result in control-flow 
errors, such as possible errors in program counter (PC), 
address circuits, steering and control logic, or any kind of 
control memories [21]. A Control-flow Error (CFE) is said 
to have occurred if the processor executes an incorrect 
sequence of instructions [3], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], 
[32], [33].  Besides these techniques, the error estimation 
and security techniques have been widely used to handle 
fault in the current computer architectures [34- 38]. 
Several CFC methods have been designed for detecting 
each type of CFEs in a program code. However, a few 
published works have concentrated on CFEs correction [7], 
[17]. After the CFE is detected, control should be 
transferred back to the block, where illegal branch has 
occurred in it. However, correcting the CFE is not sufficient 
and the program may fail since there may be some data 
errors generated by the CFEs [7]. Therefore, any data errors 
caused by CFE should be corrected before correcting the 
CFE, as well. 
In multi-core systems, since all processors share a single 
view of data and the communication between processors, 
the method which corrects CFEs and data errors should take 
into account synchronization and communication 
dependencies between threads of multithreaded program. 
Disregarding to thread interactions between different 
threads by previous CFEs correction techniques caused 
these methods not be applicable in multithreaded 
architectures. Therefore, regarding to the importance of 
handling the CFEs and also disability of the conventional 
related techniques to be utilized in the modern processors 
for correcting CFEs, a CFE recovery technique called 
CRMP (CFE Recovery for Multithreaded Programs) is 
proposed in this paper. Data errors recovery in this 
technique is based on partial check pointing. Checkpoint-
based methods are frequently used to correct data errors 
[20]. Checkpoints are often saved based on program 
execution behavior. If any error detected, program is re-
executed from the last consistent checkpoint location in the 
program. However, this may not be possible in safety 
critical applications, because getting checkpoint, restoring 
program states and re-executing impose unacceptable area 
cost and latency [17]. Moreover, consistency of checkpoint 
view should be guaranteed. 
In the proposed technique, only some of variables 
whose value is changed are checkpointed at the end of each 
basic block. This approach can considerably reduce the 
overheads of checkpoint-based methods. 
In order to detect CFEs, a signature is used for each 
basic block, and then some instructions are specified and 
added at the end of the basic block for calculating and 
checking signatures at run-time. An error-handler function 
is prepared at compile time for automatic CFE and data 
errors correction. This function is implemented regarding to 
data and control-flow dependencies among basic blocks of a 
thread and considering synchronization and communication 
dependencies between threads of multithreaded program. 
Fault injection is used to evaluate correctability and 
efficiency of the proposed technique [17]. To evaluate the 
techniques, three modified multithreaded benchmarks are 
used and evaluated by GCC, a GNU compiler. A total of 
5000 transient faults were injected into the program codes. 
The experimental results show that between 91.9% and 
93.8% of CFEs are detected and corrected by CRMP 
method without any data errors. Also, the results show that 
performance and memory overheads of CRMP is 
considerably less than previous related works like ACCED, 
CDCC [7], [17]. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 
gives related work. Section 3 introduces dependency graph 
in multithreaded program. Detection and correction phases 
which are used in proposed technique are described in 
section 4. Simulation environment and experimental results 
are presented by section 5. Finally Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Related Work 
The Control-Flow Checking by Software Signatures 
(CFCSS) technique [3] assigns a unique signature to each 
basic block. A global variable called G contains the run-
time signature. In absence of error, G contains the signature 
associated to the current basic block. G is initialized with 
the signature of the first block of the program. At the 
beginning of the basic blocks an additional instruction 
computes the signature of the destination blocks from the 
signature of the source block by implementing the XOR 
function between the signature of the current node and the 
destination node. If the control can enter from multiple 
blocks, then an adjusting signature is assigned in each 
source block and used in the destination block to compute 
the signature. The CFCSS cannot detect CFEs if multiple 
nodes share multiple nodes as their destination nodes. 
The Yet Another Control-Flow Checking using 
Assertions (YACCA) technique [21] checks the control flow 
of programs by using a dedicated global integer variable, 
which contains the run-time signature associated with the 
current node in the CFG. A unique signature is assigned to 
each basic block at the compile time. Two sets of 
instructions (test and set) are defined and inserted into each 
basic block. A test instruction controls the signature of the 
previous basic block and checks if it is permissible, and a 
set instruction updates the signature, setting it to the 
correspondent value. Moreover, differently from other 
approaches, in each basic block the added statements are 
introduced at the beginning and at the end of the blocks. 
This approach allows YACCA to detect most of the single 
inter node CFEs, including the CFEs which are not covered 
by previous techniques. However, having high performance 
overhead and high memory overhead are considered two 
weaknesses of this method. Moreover, CFCSS and YACCA 
are confined to CFEs detection and do not correct CFEs. 
The Automatic Correction of Control-flow Errors 
(ACCE) technique [17] partitions a program code into 
functions which include one or more basic blocks. ACCE 
uses CEDA technique [11] for CFEs detection. After the 
detection phase, a predefined function called error-handler 
is automatically executed, and the program control is 
transferred to the function and then to the basic block in 
which the illegal jump has been occurred. An extension of 
ACCE, called Automatic Correction of Control-flow Errors 
with Duplication (ACCED) [17], is used for data error 
detection and correction through duplicating instructions. 
However, the area overhead of ACCED is more than 100 
percent which is considerable. 
The Control-flow and Data Errors Correction using 
Data-flow Graph Consideration (CDCC) technique [7] 
partitions a program code into basic blocks and then insert 
extra instructions into the program regarding to data-flow 
graph of program at compile time. Redundant instructions 
are used to detect and correct CFEs and data errors. In this 
technique, signature of source basic block (from which the 
control transferred incorrectly) and the signature of 
destination one (to which the control transferred illegally) 
are given to CFE-handler function as inputs and control 
transferred to the nearest basic block wherein the modified 
variables between source and destination are initialized. 
However, this technique cannot apply on systems which 
need low error correction latency such as hard real-time 
systems.  
3. Dependency Graph in Multithreaded Program 
A multithreaded program running on multi-core systems 
has a number of threads that each one has its own control-
flow and data-flow. These flows are not independent since 
inter-thread synchronizations and communications may exist 
in the program. In order to represent multithreaded program, 
we present a dependency graph. This graph is composed of 
connecting graphs of all single threads in the program, using 
dependency arcs between different threads.  
 
3.1 Dependency Graph of a Single Thread (DGST) 
A thread is an entity within a process that can be 
scheduled for execution. All threads of a process share its 
virtual address space and system resources. In addition, each 
thread maintains exception handlers, a scheduling priority, 
thread local storage, a unique thread identifier, and a set of 
structures the system will use to save the thread context until 
it is scheduled [2]. However, a thread itself is not a program 
since it cannot run independently, but it can only run within a 
program [18]. The dependency graph of a single thread 
(DGST) is used to represent a single thread in a 
multithreaded program. DGST consist of a number of 
Control-flow Graphs (CFGs) and Data-flow Graphs (DFGs). 
CFG is a graph composed of a set of nodes V and a set of 
edge E, CFG={V,E}, where V={N1, N2, …, Ni, …, Nn} and 
E={e1, e2, …, ei, …,en}. Each node Ni represents a basic block 
and each edge ei represents the branch bri,j from Ni to Nj. 
CFGs are depicted at compile time and represented control 
conditions and right transmission between basic blocks. 
DFGs represent data dependencies between basic blocks. 
The DFG model implicitly assumes the existence of 
variables, whose values store the information required and 
generated by the operations. Each variable has a lifetime that 
is the interval from its birth to its death, where the former is 
the time at which the value is generated as an output of an 
operation and the latter is the latest time at which the variable 
is referenced as an input to operation. Figure 1 shows DFG 
and CFG generated from control dependency between basic 
blocks and data dependency among variables in these basic 
blocks. In this figure, solid and dashed arcs are control and 
data dependencies, respectively. 
3.2 Dependency Graph of Multithreaded Program 
(DGMP) 
The Dependency Graph of Multithreaded Program 
(DGMP) consist of a collection of DGSTs that each 
represent a single thread, and some special kinds of 
dependency arcs to model thread interactions between 
different threads of a program. These dependency arcs are 
based on: 1) synchronization between thread synchronization 
statements and 2) communication between shared variables 
of the program threads. 
3.2.1 Synchronization Dependencies 
Running each process on its own address space had the 
advantage of reliability since no process can modify another 
process's memory [9]. However, all of a process's threads run 
in the same address space and have unrestricted access to all 
of the same resources, including memory [8]. While this 
makes it easy to share data among threads, it also makes it 
easy for threads to step on each other. Multithreaded 
programs must be specially programmed to ensure that 
threads do not step on each other. A section of a code that 
modifies data structures shared by multiple threads is called 
a critical section. It is important that a critical section should 
be accessed exclusively by each thread. Synchronize access 
ensure that only one thread can execute in a critical section at 
a time. Moreover, synchronization is necessary to avoid race 
conditions and deadlocks when multiple threads want to  
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Figure 1. Dependency graph of a single thread (DGST) 
access shared resources. Figure 2 shows some additional 
synchronization arc to model synchronization between 
threads. As shown in Figure 2, a critical section containing 
shared data in both basic block N3 of thread t1 and N1 of 
thread t2 should be access exclusively through the use of 
synchronization methods. 
3.2.2 Communication Dependencies 
Communication dependency is used to capture 
dependency relations between different threads because of 
inter-thread communication. As shown in Figure 2, node Ni 
of a thread is directly communication-dependent on node Nj 
in another thread where i, j are basic block number if the 
value of a variable computed at Ni has direct influence on the 
value of a variable computed at Nj through an inter-thread 
communication. Shared memory is often used to support 
communication among threads. Communications may occur 
when two parallel executed threads exchange their data via 
shared variables. 
3.2.3 Constructing the DGMP 
To construct the DGMP of a multithreaded program, 
DGSTs of all program threads using synchronization and 
communication dependency arcs should be combined. For 
this purpose, firstly, DGST is constructed with considering 
control dependency between basic blocks and data 
dependency among variables of each basic block and 
secondly DGMP is created based on synchronization and 
communication dependencies between different threads of 
multithreaded program as shown in Figure 2. In this figure, 
bolded dotted and dashed arcs are synchronization and 
communication dependencies, respectively. 
4. The Proposed CRMP Technique 
CRMP recovers CFEs which are occurred in 
multithreaded programs in multi-core architectures with 
using DGMP consideration and partial check pointing. Most 
of CFEs can be recovered from multithread program by 
CRMP since DGMP reveals all types of dependencies in the 
program. So, inter-thread CFEs (CFEs which are occurred 
from basic block of a thread to basic block of another thread 
in the same processor) will be regained as well as intra- 
thread CFEs (CFEs which are occurred between basic blocks 
of a thread). 
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Figure 2. Dependency graph of multithreaded 
program (DGMP) 
 
Two phases are employed to recover CFEs from 
multithreaded programs. 
 
4.1 Control-flow Error Detection in CRMP 
As shown in Figure 3, source signature of thread j (SSTj) 
is a shared variable in a shared memory which contains the 
run-time signature of thread j and continuously updated in 
executed nodes, where j shows thread number of 
multithreaded program and finally stored the signature of the 
basic block in which a CFE has occurred. Each shared 
variable SSTj which keeps signature of thread j is allowed to 
be updated only in thread j. Another variable T keeps number 
of thread which is currently executed and it determines 
source thread in the case of an inter-thread CFE.  
SSTj is updated with unique number in each basic block 
Ni where i shows basic block number of thread j, for 
checking the control-flow of the program. For updating SSTj, 
XOR operation is used. This operation is performed between 
last SSTj and a number which is calculated at compile time. 
Under normal execution of the program, SSTj should equal 
calculated signature in node Ni at compile time. If SSTj 
contains a number different from the calculated signature in 
node Ni, an error has occurred in the program. 
As shown in Figure 4, CFE1 is an intra-thread CFE 
because source thread of CFE is itself (T=1).  If an illegal 
branch jumped to instructions before checking instructions at 
the end of basic block (CFE1 in Figure 4) and control 
transferred to it illegally, then CFE1 can be detected by 
comparing the stored value in the SST1 (as the signature of 
the node) with another one calculated at compile time.  
CFE2 is an inter-thread CFE (an illegal branch from one 
basic block of thread t2 to a basic block of thread t1 in the 
same processor (T=2)). These types of CFE can be detected 
by comparing last updated signature of executed thread with 
expected value. The signature of last executed basic block of 
thread t1 is stored in SST1 before switching the CPU from 
thread t1 to thread t2 and it is equal 1001. The inter-thread 
CFE2 can be detected by comparing last updated SST1 
(1001) with expected value at the end of basic block.  
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Figure 3. Basic block scheme in CRMP technique 
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Figure 4. Intra and inter thread detection 
 
4.2 Control-flow Error Recovery in CRMP 
As mentioned in CFE detection section, in the case of a 
CFE event, data errors may not repair with transferring back 
to the source block, where illegal branch has occurred in it. 
So, data errors should be corrected before correcting the 
CFE. There are two methods for error recovery [8], [9]: 
1) Forward Error Recovery: In forward error 
recovery techniques, the nature of errors and 
damage caused by faults must be completely and 
accurately assessed that may not possible.  
2) Backward Error Recovery: In backward error 
recovery techniques, the nature of faults need not 
be predicted and in the case of error, the process 
state is restored to previous error-free state.  
There are three steps involved in backward error recovery 
[20], [26]: 
1) Periodical check pointing the error-free state, 
2) Restoration when a fault occurred, 
3) Restart from the restored state . 
Depending on the programmer’s intervention in check 
pointing process, backward error recovery can be classified 
as follows: 
1) User-triggered check pointing 
2) Transparent check pointing 
User triggered check pointing employed where the user 
has the knowledge of the computation being performed and 
can decide the location of the checkpoints while transparent 
check pointing techniques do not require user interaction 
[26]. 
User triggered check pointing and backward error 
recovery are used in CRMP technique and  only some of the 
checkpoint variables are updated at the end of each basic 
block in which the corresponding original variables has been 
modified as shown in Figure 3. Through the CRMP, the 
shadow (checkpoint) variables always contain the true values 
of the original ones. These values are trustable for correcting 
the generated data errors in correction phase. Also, it can 
considerably reduce the overheads of checkpoint-based 
methods. Information about data dependency among basic 
blocks variables of each thread is already available at 
compile time and updating shadows can be specified with 
respect to it. CRMP recovers CFEs based on type of CFEs. 
 
4.2.1 Intra-thread CFE Correction 
If an illegal branch jump from one block (source block) 
to another block (destination block) in the same thread, 
original variables which are used in both source and 
destination block may corrupt [7]. So, source signature of 
thread j (SSTj) and destination signature of thread j (DSTj) are 
used to keep signature of source and destination block, 
respectively for correcting corrupted variables in both source 
and destination block when a CFE occurred in thread j.  
Shadow (checkpoint) variables always contain the true 
values of the original ones and they are updated at the end of 
basic block to store values of variables which are modified in 
basic block, as shown in Figure 3.  
When a CFE is detected through added instructions, 
control is transferred to CFE-handler function. This function 
can transfer back the control to the source basic block and 
restore the original variables with considering information of 
shadow variables, shared variable T and both SSTj and  DSTj. 
Figure 5 shows three basic blocks from the set of basic 
blocks in a program code as well as the DGST generated 
from data dependencies among variables and control 
dependency between basic blocks. Suppose that variables Y 
and Z are initialized in basic block N1, and variable X is 
initialized in basic block N2.With regards to Figure 5, the 
time of updating the shadow variables with the original ones 
can be found. For example, the value of variable Y is only 
changed in basic block N1. Therefore, the shadow of Y can be 
updated only at the end of this basic block instead of 
updating at the end of the all basic blocks. After a CFE has 
occurred, it can be detected by checking instructions. The 
CFE can change the stored values in variables used in 
computations in the source and the destination. Therefore, it 
can generate data errors in the results. After detection, 
control is transferred to CFE-handler function (step 2 in 
Figure 5). CFE-handler function determines type of CFE by 
comparing T and expected thread number. If an intra-thread 
CFE had occurred, original variables in destination and 
source basic block are updated with their shadow ones. 
Finally, control is transferred to the address of first  
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Figure 5. (a) Intra-thread CFE correction, (b) DFG 
generated from program code 
 
instruction in the source basic block (step 3 in Figure 5) and 
the code is re-executed from this point. 
Consequently, both of the CFE and the generated data 
errors can be corrected. For improving the CRMP, the 
temporal and local variables can be ignored; the act of 
making shadows for them can be omitted. By this 
improvement, shadows are only made for global variables 
which are alternatively used in the program code. 
Synchronization dependency among different threads 
may be caused in two ways [18]: create/join relations, 
lock/unlock relations. 
 
Create/join relations. A main thread can create some more 
slave threads for performing some subtasks. A function 
called pthread_create has been predefined in most of the 
multithreaded programming’s standards in order to facilitate 
the explained operation. The main thread should wait for the 
slave ones until the execution of them run out, if the main 
thread needs the results which will be provided by the slave 
ones. This operation has been also simplified through a 
predefined function called the pthread_join. If an illegal 
branch jumped to the sequential section after basic block 
containing “join” instruction before the synchronization 
execution, main thread continue with incorrect results which 
have provided by the slave ones. 
 
Lock/unlock relations. As mentioned in dependency graph 
section, a critical section is a section of code that must be 
allowed to complete atomically with no interruption that 
affects its completion. Critical sections are created by 
locking a lock, manipulating the data, and then releasing the 
lock. All shared data, data structures which are passed to 
other threads or can be accessed by multiple threads and 
global variables must be protected by locks. The mutual 
exclusion lock is the simplest synchronization variable that 
provides a single, absolute owner for a section of code. The 
first thread that locks the mutex gets ownership, and any 
subsequent attempts to lock it will fail, causing the calling 
thread to go to sleep. When the owner unlocks it, one of the 
sleepers will be awakened and it has chance to obtain 
ownership. pthread_mutex_lock and pthread_mutex_unlock 
functions have been predefined to lock and unlock mutex in 
most of the multithreaded programming’s standards. If a 
CFE occurred in create/join relations, it will be detected 
through proposed technique and create/join mechanism 
corrected by transferring back control to source basic block. 
However, CFE and data errors will not correct through 
transferring control to source basic block when CFE 
occurred in lock/unlock relations as explained below. As 
shown in Figure 6, both basic block N7 in thread t1 and basic 
block N1 in thread t2 contain critical section. Basic block N7 
in thread t1 is executed and locked the mutex before 
executing basic block N1 of thread t2. So, thread t2 is executed 
after executing unlock() instruction by thread t1. If a CFE 
occurred in another critical section (either in thread t1 or 
another thread at the same processor) and control of program 
transferred to the basic block N7 of thread t1 (between lock() 
and unlock()), the mutex which was locked by previous 
critical section, is unlocked by executing unlock() at the end 
of critical section of  basic block N7. Therefore, thread t2 is 
allowed to start its code execution before CFE detection in 
thread t1. This event may cause thread t2 works with dirty 
shared variables which are corrupted in previous thread.  
This type of CFE can be detected when critical section 
instructions are considered as a basic block and check 
instructions are putted before unlock(), as shown in Figure 7. 
Communication dependency between basic blocks of 
different threads means the value of a variable computed at a 
basic block of a thread has direct influence on the value of a 
variable computed at basic block of another thread through 
an inter-thread communication. The CFE time may vary 
CRMP correction coverage in communication-dependent 
threads as explained below. Assume an intra-thread CFE 
occurred in one basic block (assume N3 where can be source 
or destination basic block) of a thread (assume thread t1) 
which is communication-dependent to basic block (assume 
basic block N2) of another thread (assume thread t2) as shown 
in Figure 2. The terms can be listed based on CFE time as 
below: 
1) N2 of t2 is executed with true shared variables before 
CFE occurrence in t1.   
2) CFE in t1 is detected and corrected before executing 
N2 of t2. 
3)  CFE in t1 is detected at the same time N2 is executed 
in t2. 
4) CFE in t1 is detected and corrected after executing N2 
of t2 with dirty shared variables. 
Outputs of t2 in situation 1, 2 are trustable because shared 
variables will not be broken when CFE is detected before 
executing N2 of t2 or when CFE is occurred after executing N2 
of t2 with true shared variables. CFE and data errors in 
situation 3 can be corrected with considering DGMP and 
signature information of each thread in CFE-handler 
function. Shared variables in situation 4 are not recoverable, 
because shadow variables will become dirty if CFE detected 
after executing N2 of t2 with dirty shared variables. CFE-
handler function behavior for correcting control-flow and 
data errors when communication dependency is exist 
between basic blocks of different threads can be seen in 
Figure 8. 
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Figure 6. Wrong intra-thread CFE detection in basic 
block containing synchronization instructions 
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Figure 7. True intra-thread CFE detection in modified 
basic block containing synchronization instructions  
 
4.2.2 Inter-thread CFE Correction 
An inter-thread CFE can be caused by stack pointer 
faults result in a faulty procedure return. When an illegal 
branch occurred from N2 of thread t1 to N4 of thread t2, it can 
be detected by comparing last updated SSTdestination thread with 
expected value at the end of basic block (SST2 != 0100) as 
illustrated in Figure 9. After the CFE detection, shared 
variable T and both signature of thread (SSTj and DSTj) are 
given to CFE-handler function to correct control-flow and 
data errors. As shown in Figure 8, CFE-handler function 
determines type of CFE by comparing T and expected 
thread number. If an inter-thread CFE had occurred, original 
variables in destination basic block of destination thread are 
updated with their shadow ones.  
Then, CFE-handler found source thread and updated 
original variables in source basic block of source thread 
with their shadows and finally control of program returned 
to source basic block. 
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Figure 8. CFE-handler function pseudo diagram 
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Figure 9. Inter-thread CFE correction 
 
 
5. Experimental Results 
In order to evaluate the proposed technique, the GCC, a 
GNU compiler, has been used for running the program on a 
multi-core system (CPU=i7-740QM, RAM=6GB, OS=Linux 
Ubuntu10). Three well-known benchmarks have been 
utilized to execute on multi-core processor system. The main 
reason of using these benchmarks is to enable us to compare 
our results with related work. Because these benchmarks are 
widely used in the related work. 
1)    Quick Sort (QS): in which the main thread first 
partitions the 100-elements array of integers into two 
parts, by performing one round of the quick sort 
algorithm, then assigns each sub-arrays to a slave 
thread in order to sort each part separately and 
simultaneously. 
2)      Linked List (LL): in which the main thread makes 
slave threads responsible to build half of the linked 
list separately and concurrently. After joining the 
slave threads to the main thread, it connects two splits 
in order to build a single linked list. 
3)    Matrix Multiplication (MM): in which the main 
thread makes slave threads responsible to compute 
each elements of the product separately and 
concurrently. 
About 5000 transient faults have been injected on 
several points in the basic blocks of the programs. The 
considered fault models were [1]: 
 Branch insertion: it had occurred when one of the 
non-control instructions in the program was replaced 
by a control instruction, and the control instruction 
always causes a taken branch, 
 Branch deletion: it had occurred when one of the 
control instructions in the program was changed to a 
NOP instruction. 
 Branch target modification: This type of CFE 
occurred when target address of a control instruction 
is modified as the result of a fault and the control 
instruction actually causes a taken branch. 
These fault model are used for both intra and inter thread 
CFEs. On an 80x86 processor, a complete thread switch can 
be implemented using 12 assembly language instructions. 
Registers of the processor are pushed onto the stack at the 
beginning, then stack pointer is changed, and finally they are 
popped at the end for injecting inter-thread CFEs. Error 
correction coverage shows the power of the technique for 
correcting the CFEs. It is said that a CFE has been corrected 
if the program exits normally with correct output. 
Table 1 shows the error correction coverage of the 
proposed technique in compare to ACCED [17], CDCC [7] 
and Basic Check-Pointing (BCP) [7] with DGMP 
consideration. It is found that about 7.6% of the injected 
faults return correct output without using any technique. As 
shown in Table 1, about 92.6% of the injected faults return 
correct output with CRMP. On average, about 7% of the 
faults cause segmentation faults for the suggested techniques. 
Segmentation faults are generated if the illegal branches 
jump to signature update statements or a push or pop 
instruction re-execute due to CFE correction.  
CFEs which are not corrected can be classified as 
follows: 
1) Not detected CFEs are included: 
 Inter-thread CFE to basic block of another 
thread where if CPU switch to that thread, start 
from that basic block 
 Intra-node CFE (an illegal movement within a 
basic block) 
 Ilegal branch to CFE-handler function 
2) Detected CFEs but not corrected are included:   
 Ilegal jump to critical instructions 
 CFEs in communication-dependent threads 
when executed thread work with shared data 
which are corrupted in previous thread 
Critical instructions of CRMP where if an illegal branch 
jumped to it, CFE will detect but not correct are more than 
critical instructions of ACCED and CDCC. These 
instructions include signature update statement, shadow 
variables and T update statement. So, correction coverage of 
CRMP is slightly fewer than correction coverage of ACCED 
and CDCC. 
CFE detection latency is equal to the time between fault 
occurrence and the time at which the CFE caused by the 
injected fault is detected. CFE detection latency of CRMP is 
slightly more than other techniques because it only uses 
checking instruction at the end of each basic block. Figure 10 
shows the CFE detection latency observed during fault 
injection in terms of the number of instructions executed 
before the CFE is detected. 
CFE correction latency of CRMP consists of: 
 CFE detection latency  
 Latency of the CFE-handler function execution 
 Latency of updating corrupted variables with 
shadow ones  
 Latency of control transferring to source basic block 
 Figure 11 shows the CFE correction latency observed 
during fault injection in terms of the number of instructions 
executed for restoring the CFE and correcting data errors.  
Figure 12 illustrates the comparison among performance 
overhead percentages of the programs due to applying the 
methods. The performance overhead (cost) that reveals the 
amount of performance degradation due to methods 
operation, and is estimated as follow: 
 Performance Cost=Δ Performance / Initial Performance (1)     
Figure 13 illustrates the comparison among memory 
overhead percentages of the programs due to applying the 
methods. The memory overhead (cost) consists of the set of 
instructions which are added at the beginning and at the end 
of the basic blocks and the other set added for implementing 
the CFE-handler function. The memory cost of the methods 
is calculated as below: 
Memory Cost=Δ Memory Usage / Initial Memory Usage (2) 
The memory (performance) overhead of the ACCED is 
comparatively (about 100%) higher than the proposed 
technique because of adding duplicated instructions and 
executing the set of instructions used for comparing the 
results to obtain correct output. 
 
Figure 10. Comparison of CFE detection latency in 
different methods 
 
 
Figure 11. Comparison of CFE correction latency in 
different methods 
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Table 1. Experimental fault injection results for multithreaded benchmarks 
Benchmarks 
Original ACCED [17] BCP [7] CDCC [7] CRMP 
Wrong 
Results 
Correct 
Results 
Wrong 
Results 
Correct 
Results 
Wrong 
Results 
Correct 
Results 
Wrong 
Results 
Correct 
Results 
Wrong 
Results 
Correct 
Results 
% % % % % % % % % % 
QS 92.4 7.6 5.5 94.5 8.8 91.2 7.5 92.5 7.9 92.1 
MM 93.7 6.3 4.7 95.3 6.6 93.4 5.2 94.8 6.2 93.8 
LL 91.3 8.7 6.1 93.9 8.4 91.6 8.5 91.5 8.1 91.9 
Average 92.4 7.6 5.1 94.9 7.7 92.3 7.1 92.9 7.4 92.6 
 
 
Figure 12. Comparison of performance overhead in 
different methods 
The overall cost is differently calculated depended on 
the type of the applications on which the techniques are 
applied. Two impact factors have been defined for costs: α 
and β. The impact factor of the performance cost in the 
system is estimated by α, and the impact factor of the 
memory cost is estimated by β. In each system, in order to 
balance α, β, sum of these impact factors should be equal to 
one (β=1-α).  
In some applications the performance cost is more 
important than the memory one. In these situations, the 
value of α should be rather than β. On the contrary, if the 
importance of the memory cost is higher than the 
performance one, the value of β should be rather than α. The 
cost is estimated as follow: 
       Total Cost = α × Performance Cost + β × Memory Cost (3) 
Without loss of generality, α = β = 0.5, this means that 
the importance of the performance and memory cost are 
equal in our estimation. 
In order to estimate the efficiency of the methods, a 
metric (which is called Correction Coverage per Cost or 
CCC) has been defined, as below: 
CCC = Correction Coverage / Cost (4) 
where Correction coverage (Error correction coverage of 
the methods) is the percentage of the injected CFEs which 
are corrected by the technique. 
According to Figure 14, the CCC of the proposed 
technique is more than twice the CCC of the ACCED, and it 
means that the proposed technique is more efficient than the 
ACCED [17]. The memory overhead of CDCC [7] is lower 
than CRMP and its performance overhead is fair. So, 
efficiency of CDCC is near to efficiency of CRMP.    
Performance overhead of the matrix multiplication and 
the memory overhead of the linked list are totally higher 
than the others. The matrix multiplication has many 
computational operations, and the basic blocks of its code 
are larger than the other ones. Consequently, for correcting a 
CFE, the instructions which should be re-executed is more 
than other benchmarks. In contrast to matrix multiplication, 
linked list program has the fewest computational operations, 
and the number of the basic blocks separated in the linked 
list is more than the other benchmarks. Therefore, the total 
of added instructions at the end of the basic blocks is a large 
number in compare to the others. 
A comprehensive comparison among proposed 
technique and previous CFC techniques are reported in 
Table 2. As reported in Table 2, the three advantages of the 
proposed technique are acceptable overheads, preferable 
efficiency and correctability in multithreaded programs.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, a software technique to detect and correct 
CFEs in multithreaded programs was proposed. This 
technique was implemented through considering control and 
data dependency in DGST beside synchronization and 
communication dependency in DGMP at compile time. 
Also, proposed technique corrects data errors generated by 
CFEs that can cause considerable corruptions in the systems 
(especially in the safety critical applications). Fault injection 
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Table 2. Comparison of the proposed technique with some of the previous CFC methods 
CFC 
method 
Error 
detection 
coverage 
(%) 
Error correction 
coverage (%) 
Memory 
overhead (%) 
Performance 
overhead (%) 
Method 
efficiency 
Correctability 
Applicability 
in multithreaded 
architectures 
YACCA[21] 21.1-56.0 0 191.0-496.0 110.0-354.0 0.12-0.18 NO NO 
CFCSS[3] 28.8-41.0 0 26.6-63.6 16.2-69.2 0.14-0.22 NO NO 
ACCED[17] 94.0-97.5 93.9-95.3 215.5-236.0 149.5-189.8 0.23-0.25 YES NO 
CDCC[7] 92.3-95.7 91.5-94.8 89.0-99.4 69.9-89.5 0.50-0.54 YES NO 
BCP [7] 91.5-94.8 91.2-93.4 230.8-254.3 153.0-199.0 0.21-0.22 YES NO 
CRMP 92.0-95.0 91.9-93.8 112.0-142.5 38.0-43.5 0.50-0.60 YES YES 
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experiments showed that the proposed technique, when 
applied on the programs, produce correct results in over 
92.6% of the cases. The latency and the additional memory 
required for correcting the CFEs and the data errors are 
considerably less than the duplication based and checkpoint 
based methods which have been recently published. A 
metric for estimating efficiency of the techniques was 
defined, and it was shown that the proposed technique is 
more efficient than the duplication-based and checkpoint-
based methods. 
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